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This Research …
• Builds knowledge in ‘behavioral acquisition’ which 
explores defense acquisition from a behavioral 
standpoint, including the impact of psychology, 
organizational behavior, and politics. 
• Helps us better understand and predict how acquisition 
professionals and senior leaders think and make 
decisions within acquisition programs. 
• Behavioral acquisition studies the decisions acquisition 
professionals make.
• Analogous to behavioral finance, which incorporates 
general principles of psychology and behavior.  
3
Research goals include …
• How acquisition professionals think
and
• How Hierarchies, Culture, Leadership and Biases
influence decisions within acquisition programs
and
• How to increase the effectiveness of the 

































• 1990 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) 
• 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA)
• 1996 Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA)
• 2009 Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act
• 2010 Better Buying Power (BBP) 1.0
• 2012 Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0
• 2015 Better Buying Power (BBP) 3.0






Connection of hierarchical, leadership, cultural, management, and behavioral factors on 
decision-making and program outcomes
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Behavioral Biases within 
Defense Acquisition
• Focuses on one particular aspect of these 
decision processes in the defense acquisition 
environment: behavioral biases. 
• Research questions:
– How do behavioral biases affect decision making in 
acquisition programs?
– To what extent do behavioral biases affect acquisition 
outcomes?
• Case-study based approach for evidence of biases 
in decisions and outcomes.
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• Behavioral Biases observed:
– Planning fallacy (this time it is different)




Behavioral Biases within 
Defense Acquisition
• Planning fallacy:
– Planning processes themselves bias manager 
beliefs and lead them to make program forecasts 
that are too optimistic
– Hence the fallacy of planning: it actually leads to 
control expectations and optimism that are 
unwarranted illusions when the context of 
programs is fully considered
– Good management practices may just compound 
the planning fallacy. 
12
Behavioral Biases within 
Defense Acquisition
• Optimism bias:
– Tendency to expect positive outcomes even when such 
expectations are not rationally justified
– Over-optimism leads to a focus only on positive 
information (good news only):
• See only positives in ambiguous situations
• Make suboptimal decisions such as setting unrealistic goals
• Less likely to learn from failure 
• More likely to persist with failing courses of action for longer 
periods (thus wasting resources)
• More at risk of escalation of commitment (another infamous 
problem in projects).
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• Recency bias:
– Widely recognized bias where recent data is given 
disproportionate emphasis in judgments
– More difficult to remember information that is older 
because of memory decay
– More weight being placed on the latest information or 
initiative
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• Trade-offs bias:
– Central to program management are trade-offs 
between program cost, schedule and performance. 
– Decision models premised on idealized rationality  
bump-up against the realities of bounded cognition in 
organizational settings
– The human mind naturally prefers to find a dominant 
reason for a choice (reason-based) rather than delving 
into the complexities of cost-benefit analysis
– Accountability and group conflict are two explanations 
why reason-based choice may be affected by social 
dynamics
15
• Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH)
– Since 2003, 1.8M procured leveraging                       
aramid technology
– About 3 lbs., ballistic protection against 
small arms and fragmentation 
• Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH)
– Rapid acquisition turned into 4 year 
(2009-2013) development with new
high molecular weight polyethylene   
technology
– Firm fixed price (FFP) contracts, 35K 
procured
























Behavioral Biases within 
Defense Acquisition
16
• Hellfire, TOW and Maverick missiles –
single mode seekers, separate warheads
– Army AH-64 Apache fires Hellfire missiles with 
precision point (PP) or fire & forget (active)
– USMC AH-1Z Cobra fires Hellfire missiles and 
TOW missiles with wire guided targeting
– Navy MH-60 Seahawk fires Hellfire missiles 
and TOW missiles.
– Navy F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet fires Maverick 
missiles with PP or fire & forget (passive) 
• Joint Common Missile (JCM)
– Joint USA, USN, USMC program with MS B in 
2004, cancelled in 2005
– Intended to replace HELLFIRE, TOW and 
MAVERICK existing missiles
– Tri-mode seeker, multi-purpose warhead, 
common motor for four RW & FW platforms
• Joint Air to Ground Missile (JAGM)
– Joint USA and USMC with MS B in 2015
– Intended to replace HELLFIRE and TOW
– Dual-mode seeker, Hellfire warhead and 
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• Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV)
– 10 year development, in production since 1980’s
– 28 tons, crew of 3, manned turret, 25 mm main gun, 
transport partial squad (6 infantrymen) 
• Future Combat Systems Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV)
– 6 year development starting in 2003, DARPA initiated with 
OTA, use of Lead System Integrator (LSI), part of Systems-of-
Systems (SoS) concept, cancelled in 2009
– 30 tons, crew of 2, unmanned turret, 30 mm main gun, 
transport full squad (9 infantrymen)
• Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
– 4 year development starting in 2010 to get production in 5-7 
years, use of firm fixed price (FFP) contracting strategy for 
prototypes, cancelled in 2014
– 50-70 tons, crew of 2, unmanned turret, 40 mm main gun, 
transport full squad (9 infantrymen), MRAP level of 
underbelly protection
• Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) 
– Starting in 2020 with Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) for 
prototypes and production planned to start in 2027
– Autonomously operated, TBD weight, TBD crew size, TBD 
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Programs Planning Fallacy Difficulty in Making Tradeoffs Over-Optimism Recency Bias
ECH Program √ √ √ √ 
JCM Program √ √ √  
Army Infantry Vehicles √ √ √ √ 
Behavioral Biases
• Root causes of program failure: ill-defined requirements, 
immature technologies, integration challenges, poor cost 
and schedule estimating, and development risk. 
• Underappreciated and understudied is the effect that 
decision biases have in contributing to root causes of 
acquisition program failures. 
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‘Behavioral acquisition’ explores defense acquisition 
from a behavioral standpoint, including the impact of 
psychology, organizational behavior, and organizational 
politics on how culture, leadership and decision-making 
affect the management and execution of program, as well 
as program outcomes.
